




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L O N D O N:

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RPJCB

A L E T T E R

T O

HIS GRACE THE DUKE OF N*****.

ON THE

PRESENT CRISIS IN THE AFFAIRS OF GREAT-BRITAIN;

CONTAINING

REFLECTIONS ON A LATE GREAT RESIGNATION:

TO WHICH IS ADDED,

A LETTER from a RIGHT HON. PERSON

T O

—, in the CITY:

TOGETHER WITH

A LETTER to the Right Hon. the EARL of B***.


O N

A LATE IMPORTANT RESIGNATION.

A N D

ITS PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES.

Such flames as high in patriots burn,
Yet stoop to bless a child or wife. P O P E.



A

LETTER

TO THE

DUKE OF N*****.

My Lord D***,

YOUR Grace may perhaps be surprised at the contents of this letter; but I flatter myself the impartial public will not think the points here discussed unimportant, nor improperly addressed; since you are now supposed to have the supreme direction of the affairs of this nation. Your administration has occasioned much political reasoning; your friends have often proclaimed the justness of your measures, your enemies as often arraigned them: in this letter, my Lord, I shall steer a middle course: no dupe to prejudice, unwarped by faction, I shall freely praise or condemn, when I speak of past times, as your conduct deserves.

The affairs of this kingdom, for a few years, have been managed with such wisdom and prudence, that the effects appear in every corner of the world: Britain is alike victorious by sea and land, a circumstance which, I believe, will be very difficult to shew was ever the case before. This short, but bright period, was preceded by one the very reverse; in war we were unsuccessful, and the domestic government of the nation was torn by faction; in a word, by blunders and knavery we were in a very

A

low

low and pitiful condition. Foreigners wonder, that a government, which political writers represent as the model of perfection, should be in a manner so unhinged, and confused, at the breaking out of a war; when it is supposed, that a monarchy so powerful as this, whose affairs are well conducted during a peace, would not, in the natural course of things, be at such a loss when a war became necessary. The surprize is natural to those who are not acquainted with what may not improperly be called, the essence of our government. Sir Robert Walpole, who continued prime minister much longer than any one before, or since his time, owed the duration of his power, in a very great measure, to his keeping his country in profound peace: it is true, in this he gave up the interest of his country to secure himself; but with many prime ministers that is but a trifle. The springs of our government are easily continued in their natural motion in peace; but when a war breaks out, a vast quantity of new machinery is necessary; the management becomes more complicated, much greater abilities are required to conduct it, and the pilot must have great skill, or he will not avoid the multitude of rocks that surround him.

If we consider these points with attention, we cannot wonder at the confusion so generally evident in a British ministry when this difficult trial is made: nor can we wonder at the unpatriot spirit of those, who sacrifice the interest of their country to their own, since that is quite consistent with the nature of man. In fact, we did not find the ministry, at the breaking out of the present war, more prepared for such an event than their predecessors, nor more willing to resign their power to those who were abler to conduct the state machine; but warded off the dreadful blow of a war as long as possible, in hopes to prolong the peace, by negociation at any rate.

At last, unable to stem the torrent, they were obliged to resign their places, or rather to share them with another faction; and then was produced that coalition of parties, so greatly advantageous to this nation, and so honourable to themselves. You, my Lord, was nearly connected with that event, and I cannot here deny the tribute of praise due to you for your share, in the conduct of the following campaigns: they were great and glorious, and redounded as much to the honour of the then ministry,

stry, as to the bravery of the people they guided. While they continued united, the war was carried on with all imaginable vigour, and our arms were attended with the greatest success. Moreover, this coalition of parties united such interests, that war was conducted with as much seeming ease, as if all was peace abroad, as well as harmony at home. No supplies were demanded for the service of the nation, but they were immediately granted by parliament, and raised by the credit of the ministry.

A late great resignation has, to appearance, dissolved this union ; at least, it is certain, that the administration of the affairs of the nation is no longer in the same hands. You must certainly allow, my Lord, that an event so sudden, so unexpected, and of such importance, must greatly alarm the nation : not perhaps from a want of a good opinion of those who continue in power, but from a fear of its being the occasion of a bad peace concluding so glorious a war. I just now mentioned the difficulty an English ministry finds in conducting one ; this results in a very great measure from the want of supplies to support it. A parliamentary interest may procure their being voted ; but the people, my Lord, must have an opinion of a ministry before they can be raised ; and a good opinion always arises from the consideration of past times.

Your Grace has too much experience to be surprised at the stress I lay on raising the supplies. Nor can you wonder at the foresight of the people, in not subscribing to funds, when they cannot depend on the ministry's pursuing those measures that are for the advantage of the nation. The value of stock is so nearly connected with the public affairs, that every man, before he subscribes his money for the use of the government, will undoubtedly consider the state of the nation, or, in other words, the state of the ministry ; for, by woeful experience, we have often found, that the former is but too nearly dependent on the latter.

The nation had a high opinion of the great Commoner who lately bore a share in the administration of affairs ; and I believe it was very justly founded : this opinion arose from the success that attended his measures, which were in general deemed national. His resignation certainly speaks some alteration ; for as he has met with little opposition in parliament, and, according to the general

notion, possessed his Majesty's good opinion, why should he resign? A near enquiry may perhaps unfold the cause of an event which appears strange, merely for want of reflection.

The success of this war has been so entirely on our side, that we cannot be the least surprized at our enemies trying every measure to change their bad fortune: 'till very lately they have been utterly disappointed: (I say 'till very lately, because their success in the late negociation is quite unknown.) Finding how unlikely they were to gain any thing by continuing the war, they very judiciously recollected the pacific overture from Great-Britain and Prussia; and they proposed a congress, which was accepted: in the interim, a negociation was opened between our court and that of France. The terms demanded by the French ministry were such, that a compliance with them would at once have given up the advantages we have gained in this burdensome and expensive war. The refusal gave rise to new proposals, and new answers, 'till the negociation was spun out to some length: almost at the conclusion of it, (if it is ended) the court of Spain made some new demands on Great-Britain; and, in their memorial, as we have reason to believe, threatened us with a war, unless we were more modest in the terms to which we expected our enemy to agree. The French minister, who conducted the negociation, no sooner departs, and new resolutions are taken, than the principal personage in the ministry, who had been so instrumental in the conduct of the war, resigns his post. This is the short state of the affair that fills so many men with surprize.

That there is some cause which produced this effect, is certain; and it is also clear, that we cannot prove what that cause is: but from many attendant circumstances, your Grace will allow me at least to form some conjectures.—We know extremely well, that the late minister's maxim was to make no peace with France, until we could command such a one as would secure our possessions in America, and repay us, by an accession of trade, for the enormous expences of the war. This plan he made the rule of his measures, and we are to suppose that he insisted, as far as his power reached, on the same being regarded in the late negociation with M. Bussy. If he met with no opposition, what should occasion his resignation? nothing

thing: but it is well known, that the C—I were divided in their opinions concerning the terms of the peace, and that it was with great difficulty this minister could get those offered by France then, rejected. However he carried his point so far as to get Bussy dismiss'd for the present. Presently after comes the Spanish memorial, which is followed by his resignation.

Your Grace will not be surprised at my supposing Mr. P***'s motives to consist in his being against the measures that he then found were likely to prevail. As he was for continuing the war, we are consequently to suppose that the prevailing opinion in the ministry was for peace. But it may be asked perhaps why he should not promote a peace as well as the rest of the ministry? we may certainly answer, that his aim was peace; but that his idea of that peace, was different from theirs. He thought the terms then in debate were not good enough; they thought otherwise. And as he found the contrary opinion likely to succeed, he thought proper not to be concerned in an affair which he could not approve. It will certainly be asked, why the peace does not appear which this gentleman disapproved? and it will be objected, that so far are we from an appearance of peace, that new preparations are now making for war.

Your Grace knows very well, how impossible it is to point out particulars in such affairs as these. When we argue from conjecture, we must be content with appearances, and not expect to have every assertion grounded on facts. The notion which I have advanced, is entirely consistent with the objections here supposed to be formed. Two campaigns passed after the Marlborough ministry was removed from their employments, but it was clearly foreseen, what turn the affairs of the nation would take when a new set came in, whose hopes, and private interests were founded in a speedy peace. And accordingly, at the peace of Utrecht, the advantages of a long and glorious war were given up, and sacrificed to the private views of a new faction.

The Oxford party then found themselves unable to continue a war, which required great supplies to be raised, by the credit of the ministry; and as the duration of their power depended on a peace, they hastily patched one up, which has been the evident occasion of every war that has happened

happened since that time. They acted in almost the very same manner as a succeeding ministry did, in a peace concluded not a great while ago; when another ministry, your Grace very well knows which I mean, followed their example, and by so doing, brought their country into that terrible situation, from which it was so lately retrieved.

Nothing can be more pernicious to the interest of any nation, than the conclusion of hasty treaties, made more to answer private than public ends. It is always the certain sign of an unsettled government, and wavering measures; and consequently must disgust other powers, whom it would be greatly for our advantage to have for allies. The Dutch were of infinite service to the common cause in the Queen's war; and although great complaints every now and then were made of their not furnishing the quota's towards the war, which they were obliged to do by treaty, yet they really bore a very considerable share in it, and acted with great vigour throughout it. The infamous peace of Utrecht forced them to give up many advantages which their interest required should be secured to them, because they were unable to continue the war without our assistance. The finest opportunity was thrown away of securing the neighbours of France from her incroachments; and that critical moment lost, which, till the present time, never occurred again.

Could we wonder, with any reason, my Lord, at the caution of our friends the Dutch, at the beginning of the last war? At Utrecht they were forced into a treaty against the mutual engagements of both nations; and when a second war broke out, they certainly acted with great prudence, in not being hasty in such alliances; nor can we blame them for the backwardness they shewed, during the whole war: it was but just policy. They had before been deceived by our government, and they determined not to make too great a risque on the faith of it again. In England we abused them for this conduct, and readily attributed their motives to the influence of French gold: but did the ensuing peace convince them that their suspicions were groundless? so far from it, that your Grace very well knows it was a second Utrecht. The interests of this nation, and its allies were given up; not from an inability to continue the war, but for its necessity to secure private interests.

At

At the opening of the present war, we, as usual, endeavoured to involve the Dutch in it; but experience had made them too wise to put any trust in a government so unstable in its foundations, and so fluctuating in its measures. They had twice paid extremely dear for their alliances with us; common prudence now taught them to renounce any offensive connection with us, to despise our ministry, and laugh at our remonstrances. Thus, my Lord D***, we lost the assistance of this powerful people, which would have been of very great consequence to us in the late campaigns. I believe the most sensible politicians will agree, that it would have been much more advantageous for us to have made Flanders the seat of war, than the country on the other side the Rhine: those fortresses which were heretofore so famous, are no longer the same places; and the ease of supplying an army in Flanders, especially when the Dutch were our friends, must naturally be much greater, than where the war is now carried on.

Your Grace will readily perceive from what I have said, that I am of opinion, a peace at present, may not be so far off as is commonly imagined. As to the preparations for war, they appear as a gale, which may very speedily be blown over. If this peace is so far off, and an answer given to the Spanish memorial that is agreeable to the interest of this nation; it forms a contradiction to the great Commoner's resigning his post at so critical a time. Have we the least reason to suppose that he would take this step merely from caprice? Is it not rather much more likely, that his motive was the disapprobation of the measures which he perceived were then going to be executed? His interest in the administration was not considerable enough, to direct the affairs of peace and war; perhaps it would have been for the interest of this nation, if it had been so. I would not be supposed from hence, to intimate that we are just going to have a peace: I would only shew, that new maxims have been adopted, which, I apprehend, will in the end be productive of such a one as Mr. P*** would never have approved.

The present campaign, my Lord, is not yet finished; so that there is time enough yet this winter, to conclude a very admirable peace. I don't know whether we have not one or two first rate peace-makers in this kingdom, that would patch up another Utrecht in a month, or perhaps

haps less time. 'Tis true, your Grace's abilities are perfectly well known; your disinterestedness is very celebrated; but above all, your former administration has rendered you so deservedly famous, that Britain cannot but regard you as one of her guardian angels, and the chief pillar of the state; so that we can have little to fear, as long as your Grace's infinite abilities are employed in the service of your * * * * * the meaning, my Lord D * * *, must be very obvious.

The present ministry, my Lord, should certainly consider the opinion of the people; if they are persuaded that the administration of affairs, is in the hands of men who will only consider the nation's good, supplies will easily be raised; and while that is the case, the war may easily be continued. But if any change happens, which should give the people reason to suspect that new maxims are adopted; can it be supposed they will subscribe to funds? if the ministry have not credit enough with the moneyed men to raise the supplies, they must either resign their power to those who have more credit than themselves, or make a peace, and, by so doing, finish the period of wanting such immense sums. As to the first point, I shall say nothing of that; but the second is much more probable.

The national debt, my Lord, is now become an object of very serious concern to this nation: it would not require a great deal of reasoning to prove, that there is at this time a real crisis in our affairs, and arising, in a very great measure, from this enormous debt. The very interest of it now amounts to upward of three millions, visibly! And I have great reason to believe, that when accounts come to be settled, it may disclose some unexpected items, that will not a little surprize the nation. When a government is so immensely involved, those people who lend money to it, will be very observing how its affairs go: a strong proof of this, is the effect which good or bad success has on the price of stocks. For if the very interest of the debt amounts to so considerable a part of the annual revenue of the kingdom, the value of the principal will depend entirely on the riches of the nation; and it is very well known how nearly connected these riches are with the terms of every treaty of peace we conclude. I will readily allow that this debt is not an object of dread, if we increase our trade by the ensuing peace in proportion

tion to the increase of debt. But if, on the contrary, we should considerably increase the burden, without, at the same time, enabling ourselves to bear it, we must be making hasty strides toward bankruptcy.

The terms of peace, which I am informed by very good authority, were rejected as long as a certain great man was in the administration, were such as could not be agreed to by us, the least consistently with our interests. There were some particular articles which concerned our trade more nearly than the rest; the one was yielding up Guadalupe to France; and another returning them Canada, reserving only a barrier; giving them liberty to fish on the Banks of Newfoundland, and ceding the isle Sable to them for drying their fish. I shall not make a minute enquiry into the expediency of agreeing to these articles; but pronounce them to be extremely bad. We certainly went to war to secure our colonies in North America; this work, if such a peace ensues, we shall evidently have to perform again. As we have been at such an immense expence in prosecuting the war, we may reasonably expect some advantage from it; and how can this be obtained but by retaining our acquisitions? If we give up Guadalupe, we give up an immense trade with it; that valuable island produces as much sugar as Martinico, and maintains a great number of sailors yearly. The preserving so valuable a conquest will very greatly assist in repaying us our expence in making war. The Newfoundland fishery is another prodigiously important branch of trade: even while the French had by treaty only a small share of it, they were able to undersell us in the principal markets of Europe, and, consequently, almost ingrossed the trade; what therefore will they do when they have the island of Sable in their possession, which is so well situated for the fishery? Why it will most certainly be found a second Cape Breton to them, and their fishery will be just as valuable to them as it was before the breaking out of the present war. Thus we shall give up the very point for which war was commenced, and plunge ourselves into a most enormous expence, without gaining any equivalent, or means to bear it.

The people of this nation are deceived with respect to the liability of their commerce. Some men fancy from the immensity of trade we now possess, that we shall con-

tinue to keep it. But if such a peace as I have just mentioned is concluded, nothing can be more fallacious than this notion. Great Britain, I believe I may with safety say, never possessed so extensive a commerce : but a very great part of it is owing to the destruction of that of France. We now serve a multitude of markets, which the French before had entirely to themselves ; and although neutral nations have profited by the war between us, yet some branches are entirely in our possession. The cod fishery now brings prodigious sums into this kingdom : our sugar trade is also greatly increased ; and the demand for our manufactures in North America is infinitely superior to what it ever was before. These are the advantages we enjoy at present ; but will this, my Lord, be the case after such a peace ? Every article will be totally different. Our trade will be very different from what it is now ; our neighbours, the industrious French, will soon possess a flourishing commerce ; and as theirs increase, ours must necessarily diminish. At present we do not feel the burden of our national debt so extremely heavy ; but what shall we do when we have lost such considerable branches of our trade, which is the source of our riches, and which alone enables us to pay three millions a year in interest ?

Doubtless the great Commoner considered these points with that attention which their importance deserves ; and he could not reflect on them without seeing the absolute necessity of making a very good peace. He indeed had spent many millions, or to speak more to the present purpose, had greatly increased the debt of the nation ; but then must not any other minister have done the same ; and perhaps without making such great acquisitions as we have done during his administration ? Has not every minister, since we have had a debt, done the same ? But who ever spent the nation's money so much to its advantage ? Mr. P*** certainly knew the consequences of running so deep in debt ; but he also knew, that such a peace as he proposed to make, would fully enable us to bear the weight of the burden laid on us to obtain it.

Now, my Lord D***, we have some reason to fear, this nation will find, at a peace, her debt immensely increased, without a proportionable increase of trade. This is a very serious consideration, and must strike a terror into every honest man who loves his country. — Here it

it will naturally be asked why the ministers, who remain in employment, may not be as able to conclude a good peace as Mr. P***? This is a question, which, at first sight, appears to carry some degree of reason with it: but may I not answer, my Lord, that, without considering their abilities, we should reflect on the motive which induced that gentleman to resign; which I have already shewed to be his disapprobation of the measures then pursuing. This clearly tells us, that the present ministry were of a different opinion from him; or, in other words, that they were inclined to a peace which he did not think good enough: Is it likely, my Lord D***, that this party should have changed their notion since his resignation? Nothing surely so improbable! I have explained how many reasons they may have to make a peace; nay, that they will be necessitated to it, for want of supplies.

It has been very currently reported, that one material reason for this great man's resignation, was his being strongly opposed in his design of entering into a war with Spain. I shall not here enter into a minute enquiry concerning the particular points on which the wisdom of such a measure would depend; but one thing is very certain, that the affair of a Spanish war, and a peace with France, were very nearly connected. A war with Spain would have thoroughly convinced the nation, that the ministry were determined never to agree to an indifferent peace. The great Commoner was for entering immediately into one: What could be his motives, my Lord, for such a conduct? Sure he did not form the scheme without having some reasons for it? Was not the memorial of the court of Spain, which I have before mentioned, the cause of it? Do we not know, from undoubted authority, that the Spaniards, for some time past, and even at present, have been making very great preparations for war? What is the meaning of this? Does it not correspond with that memorial? Were we not threatened in it with a war? It is true, the Gazette has told us we need not have any fears of such an event; but is not that article since Mr. P***'s resignation? — Does not such a concatenation of circumstances clearly shew, that there is much more behind the curtain relating to a peace, than appears to the world? If the demands of Spain were refused, and the ministry were

determined to prosecute the war with vigour, why should the great Commoner resign at such a critical period?

In short, my Lord D—, the Gazette may tell us just what tales it pleases, and the emissaries of the present m——y may scatter their reports in every corner of the town, to make us believe, that the resignation will have no consequences; yet the inquisitive minds of reflecting people, will believe their own reason sooner than any assurances that can be given them. The present m---y perhaps would continue the war, till they could procure a good peace; but their abilities must be considered, and their interest. No doubt we shall hear of the most pompous shews of warlike designs, till the s——ies for next year are granted, and, if possible, raised; but then, I, my Lord, shall expect to hear a different tale.—

The people in general of this nation form a very just opinion of the ministers who conduct the public affairs: they judge by a sign, which, in these cases, with a few exceptions, seldom deceives; and that is, success. It cannot be wondered at, that we should have been very fond of Mr. P——; it would have been extremely ungrateful if we had not. He, by the wisdom of his counsels, and his well-formed plans of action, brought his country to its present high pitch of glory and prosperity. He succeeded a set of men who were unable to conduct the great machine of the state, and who, in many, very many instances, had proved how little they regarded the interest of their country, when it came to be balanced by their own. Such an administration had reduced us to that low degree, from which his abilities raised us. Is it not therefore very natural, that we should have a great opinion of a man, who, with no impropriety, has often been called the saviour of his country? It would be stupidity or malignity to deny this just tribute to a minister, to whom we are so greatly indebted. There are few objects but what have their light and dark sides; unhappily —it gives me pain to proceed—but impartiality must be satisfied.

Somebody has observed, that there is no virtue which has stood the test less successfully than patriotism: giving up every thing for one's country, is indeed a very severe trial for the human mind to undergo, in an age when this virtue is not in the greatest repute. Among the anti-

Roman

Romans, children were taught to revere it, as soon as their minds would admit of such an idea; and, when they grew up, they had not only their own sentiments to strengthen their resolutions, but the animating example of their countrymen. In the present times the case is extremely different; so great a change has ensued, that a real patriot would now be the wonder and admiration of his age. Had the great Commoner, whom I have so often mentioned, retired from public business without that pension, which, I fear, will be so fatal to his fame: had he given up the great emoluments of his office; the high power, the splendor which is annexed to a minister of state; had he sacrificed these to his reputation, and to a sincere desire of acting only for the service of his country; what might not the great man have done? who would not have adored the name of P—t! Could a pension give an honest man that secret satisfaction, which results from a knowledge of having given up every thing for the service of one's country? would not the admiration of a whole people make some amends for the want of this pension? If money was wanted, would not this great and opulent city have settled a pension on him, equal, or superior, to what he now receives? Which would have been most honourable, to have received it as a reward for his services, from those who could not flatter in such a case, or from a ministry, as a b—be? a b—be to stop his mouth in the H—e of C—s? But supposing his honour too delicate to agree to such a proposal, though it certainly would be the greatest honour he could receive, as it would be the strongest proof of his deserts, could the present ministry have preserved their power against such an opposition in parliament, as the great Commoner ought, in conscience, to have made, if he retired from business, merely because he did not approve of the then measures? Is it not every man's duty, not only to serve his country, by acting himself for its interests, but in preventing others from acting contrary to them? If he thought his opposition would have brought him again into power, and if he knew that he acted for the good of his country when he was in power, he ought to have made such an opposition. And his receiving this pension, this cause of his downfall in the minds of his countrymen, at such a time, tells us very plainly,

plainly, that the present ministry will receive no opposition from him, let their measures be _____.

What could a ministry expect from the consequences of making a bad peace, if they were vigorously opposed in the H——e of C——s? Indeed it would be such a restraint on their actions, that we should not be in any danger of seeing a bad one concluded; for they, if they had such designs, would not be able to keep their seats till they had made one; and if they did by any means effect it, a parliamentary enquiry might be once more set on foot, and perhaps to the great advantage of the nation.

If the present m——y had designs of making a peace, at any rate, to preserve themselves in p——r, and found their interest strong enough to carry their point; if this, I say, was the case, they acted very prudently, in stopping the mouth of a man, whose voice in parliament would have been of such fatal consequence to their measures. Had Mr. P——t raised an opposition, it would at once have ruined all the schemes of his enemies; as the whole kingdom would have been alarmed, for fear of a second Utrecht taking place immediately. His throwing up his place, at such an extreme critical moment, would have told the nation very plainly, that designs were on foot, which he could not think of being the least concerned in; and his retiring unpensioned, would have given him such immense influence, that the opposite party would never have been able to keep possession of their power.

Indeed, as the affair stands at present, they may not so immediately find such terrible effects resulting from the late resignation; but I believe they will meet with more difficulty, in carrying on the war in such a vigorous manner, as to conclude it with an advantageous peace, than possibly they may expect. This resignation will make a very deep impression on the minds of the people; they will now review former times, and compare them with the present. They will consider, my Lord, in whose hands the administration of affairs is fallen; and will fear, not so much perhaps a want of abilities in some of them, as a change in the maxims that we have hitherto proceeded on. I make very little doubt but your Grace, and the rest of the ministry, will prosecute the war with great

great vigour, if you are able, that is, if you can raise money, and if a peace is not too far advanced: there is no sort of reason to apprehend your concluding a bad peace, if you have it in your power to carry on the war; and it will not be a very great while before we shall see what are your and your party's intentions.

There are so many interests to be adjusted before a good peace can be concluded, that it must necessarily take up a considerable time; or else many material points must be left to be decided by commissaries; which, to us, was always one of the most fatal measures that could be adopted. We have made war for nothing, or worse than nothing, if we do not obtain a peace that is clear and explicit in every particular. The treaty of Aix la Chapelle left the boundaries of Acadia undetermined, and even the very country, that ought to be comprehended under that name, was unknown: nay, the very name itself ought not to have been allowed, as having no settled idea annexed to it. But God forbid, that we should have any necessity, at a peace, to understand what parts of North America ought to be comprehended under any titles; for if we do not retain the possession of every inch of it, we give up what we must, in the nature of things, one day or other, go to war to regain.

It is to the surprize of every person, who knows the importance of the southern part of North America, commonly called Louisiana, that we have not yet attacked that country which is of such prodigious consequence, and yet so very weak. You, my Lord D***, have given as a reason against it, the expence of marching an army thither, and declared that, according to General Amherst's calculation, it would amount to nine hundred thousand pounds. This sum is prodigious, and it would require many arguments to prove it incredible, since the army might sail down the river Mississippi, in the same manner as it did that of St Laurence to attack Montreal.

But what occasion is there to traverse that immense country in any manner? could not a squadron of ships be sent from North America, with troops on board, to attack New Orleans without being at such an enormous expence? I know that town is at a considerable distance from the sea, and that the river is impassable for ships of burde; but then the country is good, and easily marched through,

through, and it is not above three days march from the mouth of the river to the city; but the river would serve for an attack of small craft, if such a march was impracticable. The town itself, though extremely neat and pretty, is of little or no strength, but would surrender on the first summons from a small force: and the whole country, consequently, be conquered, as it is the only place of importance in it. How much more advantageous would such a conquest be than our boasted one of Belleisle, which cost us forty times as much, and is not of the fortieth part the consequence? if we do not possess ourselves of this country, and yet resolve to have it at a peace, we must expect to give up some valuable acquisition for it; but if we make the conquest, such a cession may be saved. Your Grace must be very sensible that there will be no probability of securing our colonies, if we leave the French in possession of this most valuable region: A ministry that considered the interest of this nation in making a peace, would never think of suffering a single subject of France to remain in the whole continent of North America.

I have been very credibly informed, that the Privy Council were divided in their opinions concerning that article of the peace, in the late negociation, which returned Canada to France, and made the river St. Lawrence the barrier between the colonies of the two nations. One party, at the head of which was the great Commoner, was not for yielding up Canada, and the other, was for accepting the barrier. I have also been told, that there was an equal division in this question, but that was decided in favour of the former opinion by his M—y. Surely, my Lord D***, the members against that measure can only think of favouring the enemies of ther country? the K— acted with the wisdom which is so manifest in every thing he does, when he declared against such a fatal article. But this fact, my Lord, shews how much divided in opinion our administration were, during the stay of Mons. Bussy.

The very first principles of that negociation were very badly calculated for our interests. From what has transpired, and from what we can judge of the situation of France, their ministry very little expected a peace to be concluded; I cannot suppose, even that they sent over M. Bussy with such an intention. But I make little doubt, that their real designs were fully answered by his residence amongst

amongst us. The court of Versailles wanted more to know the state of our ministry, and what they had to expect from any changes in it, than to make a peace under such disadvantages as they must have done, while all parties were united here against the common enemy. M. Bussy no doubt soon discovered, that there were divisions amongst them, which it was by no means his business to heal; and he certainly informed his court that they had little to expect from a peace while Mr. P*** continued in power, but that he had reason to believe he would not remain in the administration long: this is not in the least improbable; for, can it be supposed, that this Frenchman did not foresee the resignation which has since happened?

There are many reasons to think, that the French had no hearty desire for a peace, but agreed to a negociation only to discover the secrets of our cabinet; and in this point they doubtless met with success. They very well know, that after such an unsuccessful war, they had no hopes in any thing but a change in the British ministry. They knew that the whole machinery of the war was turned by that single wheel, the English supplies. They were also well convinced, that if any event happened, which would lower the credit of our ministry, they might then expect to treat with much greater advantage than while we were all united and acted to one point. With this political foresight, they chose out the properest man in all France, not to conclude a peace, but to discover if there were any hopes of better times; or, in other words, if our ministry was likely to continue firmly united. I call M. Bussy the properest man in all France for his business; my reason is, his intimate acquaintance with your Grace, and some other of our great men, which gave him a much greater advantage than any other Frenchman would have had.

Your Grace will, I make little doubt, agree with me, that a vast deal of the science of politicks depends on penetration; most governments allow considerable sums to the ministers for secret services, such as procuring intelligence; but we very well know, that a man of deep penetration, and a sound political understanding, will make better discoveries than the greatest sums of money indiscriminately applied. M. Bussy had the reputation of being a man of penetration and sagacity before he came here. Now your Grace will also undoubtedly allow me, that our

ministers, when they found Mr. Bussy resident amongst them, should be to the very highest degree cautious of what they said at any time when business was not the immediate topic. I am speaking of some maxims in politics which your Grace must be convinced, are absolutely necessary to be always put in practice. We know what a prodigious effect some hints, which a certain great man dropped concerning the c—fs at A—g, in the warmth of wine and company, (before it was known such an affair was on foot) had on our stocks. This consequence it is true was not so very important. But what might that secret have been? Let us suppose the same person so unguarded in the company of M. Bussy.—What terrible consequences might such a behaviour have, in affairs of the greatest importance, and which require the greatest secrecy: but these observations may be thought rather impertinent here, besides the remark is designed for the guilty, but your Grace and I are free souls.—Let the gaul'd jade winch!

Our enemies now certainly find the advantage of having had Mons. Bussy so long at our court. They were determined not to make a bad peace; and as soon as their minister informed them how matters went at the court of London, they immediately saw the necessity of protracting the negociation till our ministry had suffered some change, which would weaken their credit, and consequently, their power, and perhaps, in the end, oblige us to come into terms of peace, most agreeable to our enemies. These have been the constant arts of France when she has failed in arms. Pray God they may not be attended with such success now as formerly.

In the ensuing peace we shall have every thing at stake. This nation is not like some others, who are clear of debt, and know their expences. In former times, when we entered into a war; if bad success attended our arms, we had the prospect of some better opportunity happening to give us our revenge; unincumbered with debts, we concluded a peace, and no longer felt the burden of the war. But how are the times altered! Every campaign now is felt even after a peace; and our debts are come to such an enormous height, that this war will increase them, almost to as great a sum, as, I apprehend, we shall be able to bear, even if we make a good peace. But what may be

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the consequence of a bad one, God only knows; though it does not require any very great degree of political foresight, to prove, that a peace, which is not to the greatest degree explicit, must be soon productive of a fresh war. France, at the conclusion of the treaty of Aix la Chapelle, was in such a low state, that all Europe expected, she would not be able for many years to enter into another war; but this opinion has proved an entire mistake, for, by making an excellent peace, she was soon mistress of an extensive and flourishing commerce, which enriched her so much, that, at the breaking out of the present war, she possessed a trade which was really astonishing, when we consider that this was all revived in seven years. This shews very plainly, that if, at the ensuing peace, that nation regains her colonies, which are the sources of her riches, she will very soon be in a condition to renew the war with us, which she will undoubtedly do, as that would be the easiest way to ruin her great rival.

Let us suppose, that, in the space of ten or fifteen years, we have another war with France, which there is the greatest reason to think will be the case, if the peace that is to conclude this, be not greatly to our advantage, and quite decisive in every particular: let us also reckon our national debt at the end of the present war, at one hundred and ten millions; a calculation, I fear, which will not be found short of the truth: how shall we be able, with such an enormous burden, to carry on a new war; unless we reserve such valuable acquisitions now, as will greatly increase our trade, and ruin that of our enemies?

In short, your Grace must allow, that if we do not conclude an excellent peace, we are an undone people: this immense debt must at last (and that period may not be at a great distance) rise to such a prodigious sum, that the whole revenue of the kingdom will not equal the interest: the consequences of such a crisis must be an immediate bankruptcy, and what fatal effects such an event must have, it is impossible to paint: but when the affairs of this kingdom are in so ticklish a situation, the ministers should certainly exert themselves with the greatest vigour towards carrying us successfully through a war hitherto so gloriously conducted. They ought never to think of a peace that did not cede for ever to us all North America, the cod fishery, and as much of the sugar trade as is possible. These

I should reckon the principal points; but what reason is there that we should return any thing that is of great consequence, such as our acquisitions in the West-Indies, all of them: Senegal and Goree, and our conquests in the East-Indies. What have the French in their possession, that can entitle them to make such demands. Minorca is their only conquest; and the possession of that has now been found entirely useless to us: Belleisle we may readily return, as the keeping it would be absurd; I am very much afraid, and it has been whispered about, that we insisted on the fortifications of Dunkirk being demolished; which, of all other demands, is the most unjust, the most absurd, and the most trivial; and is moreover, an article that the French will never consent to, unless they have something returned by way of an equivalent for it. Perhaps they will demand a few barren acres in North America; or some rocky island to dry a few cod-fish upon; but sure an English ministry will never be so utterly absurd as to give up any thing to obtain—nothing; for Dunkirk is a mere scarecrow to the mob in England; and what right could we ever pretend to have to such a demand: why don't we insist on Strasburg being demolished, or Lisle? the King of France has a better title to Dunkirk than he has to Alsace. I make little doubt but the French ministry would be extremely glad to hear of such a demand, as it certainly would be greatly for their advantage in the end.

In respect to our German connections, they need not be the occasion, in the present state of affairs, to retard or perplex us in a peace with France. I should think, that one single article would conclude every thing there that we have to settle; and that is to bind both nations, to withdraw their respective armies out of Germany, and leave every thing there on the footing it was before the war. As to the claims of the several German princes, they are much more properly to be considered in a congress of themselves, than in a peace between Great-Britain and France; as to the scheme of secularizations, they are also much more connected with the German peace than the British one. As the French have been so extremely unsuccessful every where, why should we think of making a peace, that did not secure to us the most considerable of our acquisitions; or in other words, leave every

every thing as it is in America, Africa; and the East Indies, with this addition, to secure Louisiana to ourselves.

Then, my Lord D***, how grateful would the nation be to your Grace, and the rest of the ministry! Your names would be as dear to the people as ever that of the great Commoner was. You would then obtain such a degree of credit in the nation, as few ministers ever enjoyed. But if, on the contrary, the reverse happens to be the case, what, my Lord, will be the consequence? Perhaps you may be able to continue in power till the French think proper to pick a new quarrel with us; but then you will no longer retain it. You will then be obliged to give up that with disgrace, which you possessed as the price of —

Consider, my Lord, that the interest of this great nation is at a crisis. If the war goes on with vigour another campaign or two, we may then hope, that our administration is determined to make no peace but what is greatly advantageous; and we may bear the burden of our debt with ease, as long as we possess so flourishing a commerce. If the people are absolutely persuaded, that your intention is to conduct the war with resolution, till you can secure an advantageous peace, doubtless they will give you that assistance which the late great Commoner so often received. To convince us that this is your intention, is your present business. Some will be very easily persuaded; but possibly the wary and experienced politician will not readily construe your actions so favourably as they may perhaps deserve; having been so recently and so capitally disappointed.

I am,

&c. &c. &c.

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A LETTER from a RIGHT HON. PERSON

TO

* * * * *, in the CITY.

DEAR SIR,

Finding, to my great surprize, that the cause and manner of my resigning the seals, is grossly misrepresented in the city, as well as that the most gracious and spontaneous marks of his Majesty's approbation of my services, which marks followed my resignation, have been infamously traduced as a bargain for my forsaking the public, I am under a necessity of declaring the truth of both these facts, in a manner, which, I am sure, no gentleman will contradict. A difference of opinion, with regard to measures to be taken against Spain, of the highest importance to the honour of the crown, and to the most essential national interests, (and this founded on what Spain had already done, not on what that court may further intend to do) was the cause of my resigning the seals. Lord T. and I submitted in writing, and signed by us, our most humble sentiments to his Majesty, which being over-ruled by the united opinion of all the rest of the King's servants, I resigned the seals on Monday the 5th of this month, in order not to remain responsible for measures, which I was no longer allowed to guide. Most gracious public marks of his Majesty's approbation of my services, followed my resignation: they are unmerited and unsolicited, and I shall ever be proud to have received them from the best of Sovereigns.

I will now only add, my dear Sir, that I have explained these matters only for the honour of truth, not in any view to court return of confidence from any man, who, with a credulity, as weak as it is injurious, has thought fit hastily to withdraw his good opinion, from one who has served his country with fidelity and success; and who justly reveres the upright and candid judgment of it; little solicitous about the censures of the capricious and the ungenerous. Accept my sincerest acknowledgments for all your kind friendship, and believe me ever, with truth and esteem,

My dear Sir,

Your faithful friend, &c.

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LETTER

TO THE

EARL of B***.

MY LORD,

I AM persuaded, that neither your Lordship nor the public will imagine, that the ensuing pages are meant to revive any of our political controversies, which, ever since his present Majesty's happy accession, have been confined to the cabinet, but have not divided the people. The latter, when satisfied, either through opinion or experience of the honesty and sufficiency of the ministers, are more tractable to government, and more unanimous in sentiment, than perhaps any people in Europe.

But, my Lord, though the people of England, with a pleasing kind of resignation to the will of their superiors, beheld a French minister, the most obnoxious to them, perhaps, of any that could have been sent from the continent, negotiating at this court upon the most important concerns; yet an event has happened, that, if not explained, bids fair to unhinge that unanimity, which has so lately become the glory and happiness of this island. It is my zeal for its continuance, that draws upon your Lordship this address; in which, under the sanction of your Lordship's name, a name so agreeable and respectable to the public, I shall endeavour to prove,

First, That a solid, honourable, and advantageous peace,

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in the present circumstances of Great-Britain, exhausted as her people, and multiplying as her debts are, is preferable to the most splendid successes of war.

Secondly, That such a peace would give Great-Britain an opportunity, with honour and credit for the future, to decline all continental connections, attended with such a profusion of blood and treasure, as those she is now engaged in.

Thirdly, That this system can receive no manner of shock, by the resignation of the right honourable gentleman, who, a few days ago, gave up the seals of his office.

Fourthly, That the same right honourable gentleman and his friends, whose patriotism and disinterested attachment to their country cannot be questioned, will and must, in consistence with that character, co-operate in the same good work, whether he or they are in place, or out of place, as they cannot be suspected of distressing his Majesty's measures, even supposing those measures not to be their own.

My Lord, I cannot enter on a discussion of the first of those propositions, without observing, that, notwithstanding the greatness of our successes, neither his Majesty, nor his royal grandfather, have said, they would prescribe, and not negotiate a peace. The appointment of the congress at Augsbourg, the naming plenipotentiaries, the intercourse of ministers, are all of them so many steps that indicate a negotiation; and where there is a negotiation previous to a treaty, it has, in all the course of history, ancient and modern, been supposed, that somewhat is to be given up on both sides; on that of the prevailing, as well as on that of the declining, or even prostrate, party. Edward the Third, my Lord, though at the gates of Paris with a victorious army, gave up a great deal by the treaty of Bretigny, nor did Henry the Fifth disdain to conclude that of Troyes, while in fact he was possessed of three-fourths of all France.

This being premised, it is necessary, in order to fix the terms of a just and honourable peace, that we examine what is to be given up by Great-Britain, should the congress of Augsbourg take place; for I shall not affront our sanguine patriots so much, as to presume that France has any thing to give us, but her acquiescence in what shall be

be agreed upon at the congress, and her good faith in performing it. But even this acquiescence, I most humbly suppose, must be purchased by some concessions on the part of Great-Britain. What those concessions ought to be, is the present question.

I am not, my Lord, afraid to say, that, according to the situation, the interest, and even the genius of the British nation, they ought to aspire to no acquisitions but those of commerce. The present war was begun, not with a view of enlarging, but of protecting, our trade. But the expence of blood and treasure with which it has been attended, renders it far from being unreasonable, that we should be indemnified, by the enlargement, as well as the security and protection, of that trade. The French encroached upon our back settlements; they erected a chain of forts that bade fair, and that too in a few years, either to thrust us from all our possessions upon the continent of America, or to render them insignificant to their mother-country. The question is, while matters were in that situation, what terms would the English crown and ministry have insisted upon?

As I believe there is not a man of sense in Europe, who does not believe, that, at the beginning of the war, security for our American settlements was all we expected, and all we required, I must be of opinion, that had the French then offered us that, they might have had that peace, which, I believe, they would be glad of now. Their obstinacy was equally insolent as unsurmountable; nor can we wonder at it in a people that measures right by power. They had a flourishing marine on the seas of Europe, and on the continent of America a great empire, which they thought nature and art equally contributed to render inaccessible to our arms. Some events at the beginning of the war, disadvantageous to us, more in imagination than reality, confirmed them in their obstinacy, and threw us into a despondency, or rather fever, that gave the seals to the right honourable gentleman, who lately resigned them.

No minister, perhaps, ever entered into power with greater advantages on his side. His personal and family connections, the good opinion his Sovereign had of him, with the homage the people paid to his integrity and abilities, left him nothing to wish for. All the departments

in government were filled up by his nomination, and every scheme he laid down was adopted, even before it was examined.

As I here intend to stick close to the first head I proposed, I shall not deviate from it (though perhaps it would be no deviation) by any observations on the vast accessions his popularity acquired by the miscarriage of our fleet in the Mediterranean, and that unaccountable ridiculous measure of sending for Hessians and Hanoverians to protect Great-Britain, with many other favourable accidents of the same kind. It is unquestionable, that his first measures were more vigorous, and therefore more to the taste of his master, than any that had ever been proposed before: I cannot, however, be of opinion, that all of them were of equal utility. The first expedition which was schemed, I mean the conquest of Rochfort, had it been successful, would have been of vast and durable advantage to this nation. But though it miscarried, the honourable gentleman's enemies, if he had any, were much more candid to him, than his friends were to the former ministry, in the case of Byng's miscarriage, and the loss of Minorca. No tongue or pen was employed in imputing to him the failure of that expedition, though it was effected perhaps through as shocking mismanagement, as any to be met with in the British history. As to the two descents on the continent of France, said by the gentleman's friends to have been projected by him, to make the French sensible, that they were vulnerable in their own territories, I can by no means see the good effects they were attended with to this nation. I think they have proved the French to be invulnerable; because I must be of opinion, that there is a difference between a scratch and a wound. Perhaps, when we consider, that both those expeditions cost us an immense expence, and some blood, if not disgrace, it will puzzle the warmest friend the right honourable gentleman has, to point out one national purpose they answered, if we except the splendid parade of carrying the cannon of Cherbourg to the Tower of London, and the proof that France was accessible upon her own coasts. Were I to hazard conjecture, I might perhaps say, they have been so far detrimental to us, as they have taught France the manner of

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our descents, and the means of guarding against them for the future.

The conquest of Canada, it may be said, was a plan laid down by the same right honourable gentleman. I shall admit that it was, and that it has redounded greatly to his honour. But will the most idolatrous admirer of that gentleman deny, that had not Providence, for I shall not call it Chance, co-operated with the incredible resolution of the British troops, and the British general, it must have been felt as the most fatal, and considered as the most extravagant scheme that ever was attempted to be put into execution by this country. Whoever throws his eyes up on the last letter on that subject, written by the brave General Wolfe, compared with the subsequent operations, which almost, by miracle, proved to be successful, must be of that opinion. Notwithstanding this, I shall admit, that the conquest of Canada was a great, a solid, and a glorious acquisition to Great-Britain.

I shall not here dispute, tho' perhaps I might be supported in disputing it, whether the reduction of Louisbourg was planned by him or not. Be that as it will, it is certain the conquest of Louisbourg was but a negative advantage, and no acquisition to Great-Britain; and that the same was not only planned but executed under a ministry, in which I believe neither the right honourable gentleman, nor his friends, will pretend that they had the smallest interest. Your Lordship may perceive that I do not here attempt to raise any argument from the very disputable measure of demolishing the fortifications of that place, which, by the privateering turn, to our disadvantage, the war has taken in those places, must, if standing, have been of infinite service to the British shipping.

I shall readily admit, that the conquest of Goree and Senegal was entirely owing to him; and that he shewed great sagacity in falling in with the plans laid before him for reducing those places, by persons who were acquainted with their strength and situation. But, my Lord, the question with me is, whether Great-Britain hitherto has found those acquisitions to be of so great advantage, as they were given out to be, to our interest and commerce; whether they are not, in fact, the grave of English subjects, or whether they ever can compensate for that immense mortality that is entailed upon our possessing them.

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The conquest of Belleisle, my Lord, is another flower I shall readily admit to have been added to the British garland by the same right honourable gentleman. I call that conquest, my Lord, a flower, because I think no reasonable man, either at home or abroad, can imagine that it will be permanent; or if permanent, that it will not cost us fifty times more than it is worth. I shall, however admit, that it was right to reduce that island, because, whatever it may be worth to us it is of vast consequence to France, and may claim a proper equivalent in a subsequent negociation; not to mention the great figure we have acquired by the conquest of it in the eyes of all the rest of Europe.

Our conquests in the East Indies, my Lord, I can by no means admit to have been in any degree owing to the councils of the right honourable gentleman in question; for tho' both the royal troops and shipping were employed in them, yet the plan was laid and attempted long before the right honourable gentleman came into the administration; and considering the present constitution of that company, it may be disputed whether the advantages resulting from those conquests are national or partial.

I have stated those considerations, my Lord, not from any malignity towards the honourable gentleman, but because "Amicus Plato sed magis amica veritas," I love him much, but my country more; and I am sorry to see too many of my fellow-subjects so far deluded, as to think that the resignation of Mr. P—— is but another term for the destruction of Great-Britain. Their zeal, by the bye, pays but a very sorry compliment to his present Majesty and his royal grandfather, and the constitution of this country; for they cannot attribute all our successes and glory to him without supposing him to be what is inconsistent with the British government, a first, a sole, nay an independent minister. Your Lordship, I am sure, knows far better than I do, that no man can dictate at a British council-board; and that every public scheme that is to be executed, must have the approbation of the sovereign, or a majority at his council-board, or both.

Having said this much, my Lord, give me leave to add, it has been too frequent in this country, in the heat of conquest, and while the acclamations of triumph are tingling in our ears, for both ministers and people to strike in-

to spendid deviations from the national interest; and I think every conquest is such when it costs more than it is worth; and when its importance does not answer its maintenance. I shall not here positively aver this to be the case with regard to the conquests of Great-Britain during the present war; but if it is, a safe, and an honourable peace, (that I may keep to my first proposition,) may certainly be made, tho' we give such conquests up. I have hitherto designedly avoided the mention of our acquisition of Guadalupe, because the public voice, or rather one part of the public, seems to put it in competition with that of Canada. That it was conquered during the administration of the right honourable gentleman here pointed at, is certain; but that it was conquered in consequence of his plan, is more than questionable. If the plan was originally his, he intrusted the execution of it to perhaps the most improper officer, with regard to enterprize, in his Majesty's service. The consequence was suitable to the character of the person employed, for it miscarried, and miscarried in such a manner, that the public is still at a loss to account how it possibly could miscarry. That is was resumed will not, I believe, be pretended by the gentleman's friends, to have been owing to his advice or direction; and all the world knows, that we owe the possession of the island to that temerity, which, when unsuccessful in war, is termed, Madness and when successful, Heroism. I am far from saying this, to derogate from the merit of the general, the officers, and the troops who made the conquest. The greatest names in history owe their lustre to a happy temerity; and had not the attempt been resumed, the enemies of Great-Britain might have laughed her to scorn at seeing her arms baffled.

This review, my Lord, of our victories and conquests during the right honourable gentleman's administration, can by no means be thought impertinent, because however important or unimportant they were, it is extremely plain, that the public voice did him injustice in attributing them solely to him. But let us fall in with the madness of his admirers so far, as even to admit he was the sole director, shall we swell his other praises with that of having been frugal of the public money. My Lord, I do not say that he squandered it, but I must be of opinion, that his was the most expensive administration that Great-Britain ever did see, and, I hope, ever will see again; and that

that all the emoluments that possibly can be due to us from our conquests, are insufficient to indemnify us for the sixth part of the annual interest of the money they cost us.

I know, my Lord, the common cant of shallow politicians, that the money is all spent amongst ourselves. Admitting it is, and that no kind of consideration is to be had to the principal, but still the yearly interest must be paid, and it cannot be paid without a yearly multiplication of taxes; what the consequence of this must be in the end, is worthy of serious attention.

When the right honourable gentleman first came into the direction of affairs, we were told from the throne, that the more vigorous our preparations for war were, and the more briskly it was pushed, we must the sooner come to an end of it; or, in other words, the more money you lay out this year, you will be obliged to lay the less out next year. The public cheerfully adopted this doctrine: the money was raised without murmuring, and the war went on with vigour; but, however, it was far from being ended. Next year, double the money was wanted, the same language was made use of, and the public were taught, in terms of the homely proverb, Not to lose a hog for a halfpennyworth of tar. The money accordingly was again raised without murmuring. Now, to be sure, this immense sum must do the business; France, before the campaign is over, must be brought to her marrow-bones, and then there is an end of those immense demands. No; the next, and another session is ushered in with the same assurances, and the same demands; and should the war continue, I shall not at all be surprized to see the ensuing session opened in the same strain.

Taxes, my Lord, as well as all other matters of policy have their bounds, and these are fixed in a just proportion between the exigencies of the state, and the abilities of the people. Exigencies foreign to the interests of a people; exigencies contrived to replenish the rattle of popularity, or to gratify a useless favourite, perhaps a baleful passion in the people, must, in the end, create demands that surpass their ability to satisfy. This, my Lord, ever has been, and ever will be, attended with one of two consequences; either the crown must become absolute, or contemptible. In this country, where public faith is the faith of parliament, the last consequence is most to be feared.

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The manufacturer, the labourer, and the mariner, must work for the credit of the public ; and a sufficiency will not remain to support either the proper dignity or power of government, or to answer the future necessary exigencies of state. Supposing, for instance, the present war was to last, at its present expence, for two years longer; that is, supposing the public debt to be increased about 800,000 l. a year; add this to the immense annual interest we already pay; and let me ask any reasonable man, whether Great-Britain, extended as her commerce; and powerful as her armaments are both by sea and land, will be able to answer the demand, and at the same time raise the money for the necessary purposes of government.

Your Lordship may perceive, that I make no question about raising the principal sum; for I make no doubt that in two years time it might be raised. But, my Lord, I am singular enough to think, that to be one of the worst symptoms attending the civil state of Great-Britain, because it plainly evinces the immense profit arising to the public creditors, and which must absolutely accrue from the labour of the husbandman, the merchant, the mariner, and the manufacturer. Here I know it may be said, and it has been said, why not tax the funds? The answer is, such a taxation would be unjust in itself, and destructive of public credit. They who have money in the funds, pay, in common with those who have not, their proportion in the taxes upon the ordinary necessaries, conveniences or luxuries of life; and should the parliament break in to the bargain they made with the public creditors, it must depart from its good faith, the only consideration which hitherto has supported public credit.

From what has been said, I apprehend it to be extremely clear, that the credit of the public must be overstrained, the moment our debts become such that the government cannot, within the year, raise the annual interest of them; and I should be glad to know how we can more effectually come to that melancholly pass, than by continuing the galloping manner we have been in for some years past. There is no want of money, says a sanguine citizen, for carrying on the war. I say, so much the worse. The difficulty does not lie in the subjects supplying the government, but in the government repaying the subject. In short, can this nation, with all its riches and grandeur, in time of

peace, every year raise eight millions of money? Frugality and œconomy, I know, can do great things; yet give me leave, my Lord, to say they cannot work impossibilities. I call it an impossibility to reduce the interest owing to the creditors of the public.

I admit that the interest has been reduced. But how? not by making the parliamentary faith "felo de se," in saying to its creditors, You shall accept of so much interest, whether it pleases you or not; but by giving the creditor a fair and honest option, which is frequent in common life, "Either accept of the interest I am willing to pay, or take back your principal." A government, my Lord, may talk that language when it owes but sixty millions, without much danger of being taken at its word; or if it is, without much difficulty of fulfilling it; but where is the minister who will venture to speak in that stile when the public debt is more than double that sum, and when the alternative lies between the creditor's receiving his principal, or his accepting an annual sum that falls short of the natural interest of money in this country? But this point is of itself so extremely clear, that I shall insist upon it no longer.

I am, however, somewhat concerned to reflect, it is possible some well-meaning people may think I ought not to tell those matters in Gath, or to publish them in Askelon. Alas! my Lord, they are truths that are already but too well known to the Philistines, and even to the daughters of the Philistines: they are the truths that make them rejoice. They are truths that seem to be hid only from ourselves; and for that reason they the more require to be published. The whole present dependence of France is upon our continuing the war till our public credit shall be overstrained; and then we must do without an equivalent, and with shame, that which we may do now to our advantage and with honour.

I hope I shall not be understood as suggesting, that we are to forego all we have gained by this war, rather than continue it. No; nothing can be farther from my thoughts; nothing ought to be farther from the thoughts of any man who values the interest and reputation of this country. But, my Lord, I am free enough to say, I think we have done enough for the purposes of advantage, and perhaps too much for those of glory. His majesty must have thought, in the terms of my first proposition, that a solid, honourable

rable, and advantageous peace, is preferable to the most splendid successes of war; when in the middle of those successes he named his plenipotentiaries for the congress of Augsbourg. Were that congress now holding (and I must acknowledge I am sorry it is not) we should not be obliged to comply with unreasonable demands. Should the French say to us, " You shall give us back Quebec, Guadaloupe, or Senegal," we say, No. What is the consequence? the war continues, but not a war of enterprize and offence, but of self-defence and justice. We are in possession; let us throw the labouring oar upon France; let her spend those sums upon enterprize and offence that we have expended, and then let us see how long she will continue in her imperious mode. But as I cannot help looking upon the French to be a sensible people, so I can by no means imagine, that they will talk in that strain, or that they are not willing to make proper allowances for those successes that have been attended with such a profusion of our blood and treasure.

The question however still recurs; what is a solid, honourable, and advantageous peace? To solve this question, my Lord, I must have a retrospect to the principle upon which the war was undertaken and conducted, which was that of security to our American possessions. The conquest of Quebec and Canada, tho' rather an accidental, than a primary, object, is said to be conducive to that security; and if it really is, let us retain both. Your Lordship best knows, whether M. Bussy, before he departed from London, did not publicly declare, that his master never would renounce his right to Quebec, were he besieged in his palace of Versailles by a hundred thousand men. But, my Lord, I am far from thinking that this declaration was either sincere or unreasonable. It is well known that ministers, especially French ministers, employ the loudest language when they are instructed to make the amplest concessions. Had such a minister as Sir William Temple heard M. Bussy make such a declaration, he would immediately have whispered into his master's ear, that he was sure he had something very like a *Carte Blanche* in his pocket. I must therefore think the declaration was made to enhance the value of his concessions, and from some symptoms, he imagined he discovered in his Majesty's council, of fondness for peace on any terms.

But, my Lord, as I have already hinted, supposing the declaration to be sincere, I cannot think, that even if his Most Christian Majesty sticks by it, it can be of the least obstruction to our concluding a solid, honourable, and advantageous peace. Our possession of Jamaica is of, at least, as much consequence to us as our possession of Quebec; and yet the Spaniards, notwithstanding the many treaties we have had with them, and the friendship that has for these twelve years subsisted between us and them, have never renounced their right to Jamaica. We keep it notwithstanding, and I hope we always shall keep it. In short, my Lord, were a peace made to-morrow under the amplest renunciation, on the part of France, of all we have conquered, I should think possession our best, if not our only, security. He must be a novice in history, indeed, who is ignorant that the capital maxim of the French monarchy is, that all renunciations are, of themselves, void and of no effect, if they tend to the prejudice of the crown; and, my Lord, on the principles of monarchy linked with those of hereditary succession, I am not sure but they are in the right. At least, were I a British minister or counsellor, I should be extremely tender of advising his Majesty to renounce, even for himself, the most disputable right he has.

" But the French will not make peace, unless we give back Quebec." Then let them make war, and try to recover it. As they can have no hopes of that, it is absurd to imagine, that, with the viper, they will lick the file, and imagine their blood to be ours. Upon the whole, therefore, if it is in our breast to keep possession of Canada, against all the power of France, as it undoubtedly is; and if that possession is necessary for the security of our American colonies, we never can imagine, that the negotiations for peace will be obstructed on that account. I should not even be either surprised or sorry to see the treaty between us and France published by authority, without either Canada or Quebec being once mentioned in it. No man of the least knowledge or experience in life can doubt, that the most express stipulations on the part of France, on that head, will last no longer than her inability to break them.

I shall now turn my view to the other important conquest we have made upon the French in America; I mean that

that of Guadaloupe. This, tho' a fortunate acquisition, must be acknowledged to be extraneous to the original necessary principle upon which the war began ; and therefore I must be of opinion, that our returning it cannot affect that security for which we fought at first. But are we to return it after the expence we have been at in conquering it ? I should be as loth, my Lord, as any man in England, to agree to our giving back the smallest portion of what we have acquired from France, did I not think such a cession infinitely preferable to the continuance of this devouring expensive war. But, in fact, is our retaining Guadaloupe of that vast consequence to this nation as has been represented ? have not those representations been exaggerated beyond the bounds of truth, probability, and, give me leave to say, of possibility, by a set of men in this island, who find their interest in discouraging the planters of our own islands, and in endeavouring to render their commodity a drug ? I shall readily admit, that the greater the quantity of sugar is that comes to Great-Britain, it is so much the better for us. But can that sugar be raised no where but in Guadaloupe ? If the public is not grossly misinformed by those who have the best opportunities of knowing, the neutral islands, which France is willing to relinquish to us, and which, at a very little expence, we can render tenable against all her power, may with proper cultivation be made capable of producing more sugar than either Guadaloupe or Martinico, or indeed both together. When I mention this, I am far from undervaluing the acquisition of Guadaloupe. I know it to be of great importance, but important as it is, I think the restoration of peace to this country is more so ; especially if our resigning Guadaloupe can be compensated, as it certainly may be, by our peaceable possession of the neutral islands. Add to this, that Guadaloupe is by no means necessary, as Quebec is, to the preservation of our American possessions. Rationally speaking, therefore, upon the whole, that peace must be solid, honourable, and advantageous, that not only answers the end for which we took up arms, but gives us such an additional security, as renders it almost morally impossible for the French ever to become again either our rivals or our enemies in North America.

Thus far I have confined myself to what was properly the primary object of the war. I now proceed to a few considerations

federations concerning the consequences, or the secondary objects; and such I take our concern in Germany to be. Our connections with the King of Prussia were formed by the injustice of France, who, in consequence of a quarrel in America, attacked his Majesty's electoral dominions in Germany. The right honourable gentleman who has lately resigned, is the best judge in what terms he and his friends used to talk of continental connections. They too can best account why, in the progress of the war, those connections grew more extensive, and more important, than they had ever been since the accession of the present family to the crown of Great-Britain, even under administrations that were the most odious and unpopular on that account. But, my Lord, I am not disposed to find fault, and scarcely animadvert upon inconsistencies. I think Great-Britain has acted not only generously, but wisely, in the assistance she has given to his Prussian Majesty, and the protection she has afforded to the electorate of Hanover; but I must at the same time be of opinion, that a British minister might, with a very good grace towards his country and all Europe, admit of a negociation for peace, without insisting upon full and ample amends for all that the King of Prussia, and the Elector of Hanover, have suffered since the commencement of this war. Were such indemnifications to be always insisted on, no peace could be made. The French, as well as their enemies, have had their losses.

The right honourable gentleman's friends, I know, have said, that a separate peace between Great-Britain and France would be of very little service to his Prussian Majesty, as the two Empresses appear determined not to lay down their arms but with his ruin. In answer to this, we are to observe, that his Prussian Majesty himself, who understands his own situation and interest, at least as well as we do, is of a different opinion, and thinks, that if he was eased of the French, he could give a very good account of his other enemies, numerous as they are; but, even granting that not to be the case, is Great-Britain to suffer, because two women are obstinate and vindictive? We have done for his Prussian Majesty all that we could do, and more perhaps than any ally ever did for another. Should the malice of his enemies continue, we shall be enabled to do more, if we are at peace with France; and

a very little will turn the scale in his favour, as the balance even at present is very little more than doubtful. The British ministry, therefore, my Lord, may very honestly, and very consistently with the character of true patriotism, enter upon a negociation, of which the neutrality of France, with regard to Prussia and Hanover, is a preliminary stipulation. Were such a preliminary established, it would then be in the power of Great-Britain to give the King of Prussia more effectual assistance than ever, and with far less detriment to herself: nor can I look upon any minister, who should oppose a negociation on such a basis, in any other light, than that of being an enemy, not only to peace, but to his country. All Europe would applaud such a negociation; and whatsoever the event of the war might be, between his Prussian Majesty and his other enemies, the constitution of the Germanic body must revert to its natural system. France, as guarantee of the treaty of Westphalia, never, in her cooler hours, can approve of those connections, which rage and resentment against Great-Britain hurried her into with the house of Austria: it never can be her interest to see the protestant cause ruined in Germany, where a balance of power against the court of Vienna is necessary for her safety. In short, my Lord, I can consider the present and late conduct both of France and Austria, only as that of two persons in a delirium, or a fever. France has given some indication, that the crisis of her distemper is approaching, and it was the business of a British minister to have encouraged and promoted her cure. The ruin of the electorate of Hanover and Brandenbourg could serve only to aggrandize the house of Austria to the prejudice, and, in the end, perhaps to the ruin, of that of Bourbon.

Can we imagine, that there is a thinking man in the French King's dominions, who is insensible of this truth, and who will not lend his hand towards dissolving the present unnatural connections between the two houses. In what I say, I am far from pleading the cause of France. Her dangerous views, her perjuries, and perfidy, with her perpetual enmity to the peace of Europe, and the interest of Great-Britain are but too well known; but, in this case, it happens for once, that her interest, and that of Great-Britain, when rightly understood, are the same; a consideration of which a British minister ought to avail himself,

himself, and, if properly attended to, may not only close up the wounds of war, but raise us to a pitch of secure greatness, that this nation never experienced before. France is now sensible of her error in attempting to extend her commerce, which she could not protect. The experiment of her rivaling the marine of Great-Britain has failed her; the purposes for which her absurd connections with the house of Austria were formed have not answered their ends; her fleets are irretrievably ruined; she is fighting in Germany against the only natural allies she has there, the protestants; and should she even carry her point against the electorate of Hanover, it will neither be worth her while, nor in her power, to maintain her acquisition; and every intelligent reader may see, that she is sensible of this truth, by the motions of her armies on the frontiers of that electorate. Could she have prevailed against Great-Britain, she would have indemnified herself for her expences in the war, not in Germany, but in America. As she has not prevailed, and as she has not now the smallest probability of prevailing, what is she to do, but to relinquish to us the primary objects for which both nations went to war, and let each of us make the best we can of the secondary ones.

This, my Lord, brings me to the second proposition I have laid down, which is, that a solid, honourable, and advantageous peace, would give Great-Britain an opportunity, with honour and credit for the future, to decline all continental connections, attended with such a profusion of blood and treasure as those she is now engaged in.

I cannot properly handle this proposition, without some slight review of the right honourable gentleman's conduct while he was in the administration, with regard to the affairs of Germany. When he entered upon the high post he has lately resigned, he professed himself to be an anti-continentalist, to a degree that I think (and I believe so did every well-wisher to the house of Hanover, and the balance of power on the continent) was inconsistent with the honour and interest of Great-Britain. He was scarcely, however, warm in his post, when some very useful distinctions were made between occasional and systematical assistances, between temporary and permanent measures, and the like; all which went so well down with the public, that, on the 18th of January 1758, nobody

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was surprised, when, as ~~s—~~—y of St—te, he presented a message from his late Majesty, for a supply to the Hanoverian army, until the further necessary charge thereof could be laid before the house. In consequence of this message, 100,000 l. was unanimously granted, to be taken immediately out of the supplies of last year unapplied, and to be remitted with all possible dispatch. Soon after this, the descent upon France, under the Duke of Marlborough, was executed, and the French were obliged to evacuate Hanover: and here our minister's anti-continenta system seems to have been entirely at an end. A new convention was entered into between his Britannic Majesty and the King of Prussia, and signed at London on the 11th of April, whereby the King of Great-Britain engaged to pay his Prussian Majesty the yearly sum of 670,000 l. sterling, and each of the contracting powers engaged to conclude no peace without the participation of the other; and the sum raised that year by parliament exceeded eleven millions of money.

The public submitted to this expence without a murmur, and the extraordinary supplies of troops which began now to be sent to Germany, created rather matter of surprize than opposition; while the public, with the most respectful resignation, waited for the event. In the mean time the news of the reduction of Louisburgh, and some other advantages gained by our fleets both in Europe and America, gave a new turn to our politics. It was then pretended, by the right honourable gentleman and his friends, that the anti-continenta system never was meant to be pursued longer, than the naval power of Great-Britain had secured her American posseſſions from insults, and left us nothing to fear, either there or in Europe, by ſea. Our connections with the continent now multiplied; our troops were poured faster than ever into Germany; our expences were redoubled; the convention between his Britannic Majesty and the King of Prussia was renewed on the 17th of January 1759; and at the same time a new convention was concluded between his Britannic Majesty and the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, by which 19,000 Hefſians were taken into the pay of Great-Britain, instead of 12,000 lately employed in the British ſervice, and the Landgrave was to receive, besides the ordinary pay of those troops, the sum of 60,000 l. in conſideration of his

immense losses, in support of the common cause. On the 21st of May thereafter, Mr. Secretary Pitt presented to the House of Commons a very alarming message, signed by his Majesty, desiring the house to enable him to defray any extraordinary expences of the war, incurred, or to be incurred, for the service of the year 1759; and to take all measures as may be necessary to disappoint or defeat any enterprizes or designs of his enemies, and as the exigency of affairs may require. In consequence of this message, a vote of credit was granted for a million of money. After this, on the 30th of the same month, followed the invasion panics; and the same right honourable gentleman had again the honour to present to the House of Commons another message from his Majesty, informing them, not that he would order any part of the great army we paid in Germany, to come over to our defence, at a time when the nation was so destitute of regular troops, that we could scarce guard our coasts from smugglers; but that his Majesty would, if he thought proper, cause the militia, or such part thereof as shall be necessary, to be drawn out and embodied, and to march as occasion shall require.

What followed since is too recent to be repeated here. Providence certainly interposed, almost miraculously, in our favour at the battle of Minden: but I must be free enough to own, that the odds against us before that engagement was fifty to one, and nothing is more certain, as appears by the defence of the noble Lord who was disgraced on that occasion, than that the victory was owing, next to the courage of the English troops, to their happy disobedience of the g-nr-l's orders. Had matters fallen out otherwise, in what a situation here must the minister have been, who advised, and even hastened, the sending over a body of troops, that, to all appearance, were too few for conquest, but too numerous for butchery. Next to Providence, they had only their valour and spirit to thank for their deliverance.

Notwithstanding our success at the battle of Minden, his late Majesty, as well as the King of Prussia, were sensible how much they had been indebted to Providence; and they wisely resolved not to presume too much upon its care, but began to entertain some serious thoughts of peace. Accordingly, on the 25th of November 1759, declarations from

from their Britannic and Prussian Majesties were delivered at the Hague to the ministers of the belligerent powers, importing, that they were ready to send plenipotentiaries to the place that should be judged most convenient for holding a congress for the re-establishment of the public tranquillity. Why this proposal did not take place, especially as we could have treated under the powerful mediation of Spain ; and as his most Christian Majesty offered to treat of a particular league with England, under the same mediation, is as yet a secret to the public. The refusal of the two Empresses, and the French King, to treat separately with his Prussian Majesty, and without admitting the ministers of Sweden and Saxony, was so far from being a reason why England should drop all separate negotiations with France, that it was the strongest reason for their being continued. Had the separate treaty gone on, there was no room to doubt, that the general conferences must have had a favourable issue. The losses of the French were at that time so enormous, and they were so entirely destitute of resources for the means to continue the war, that had we made the smallest advance towards a separate treaty, which most certainly was the interest of Great-Britain to have done, as she was no principal against any other power but France, the other parties must have agreed to such equitable conditions, as must have put an end to the war, and have saved this nation many millions, besides the lives of men, in prosecuting it upon the continent, as we have since done to no manner of purpose.

But, my Lord, though a separate treaty with France was, at that time, the natural, and the only probable expedient that could give peace to Great-Britain, and to Europe, we happened to be so unfortunately hampered by our engagements with Prussia, that, in fact, we could not act as an independent power: for while this very negotiation was in agitation, a fresh treaty was concluded with the King of Prussia on the 9th of November 1759, the fourth article of which, after renewing our subsidy of 670,000 l. a year, is as follows :

“ Their High contracting Parties moreover engage, viz. on the one part of his Britannic Majesty, both as King and as Elector; and on the other part his Prussian Majesty, not to conclude any treaty of peace, truce, or neutrality, or any other convention whatsoever, with the powers who

have taken part in the present war, but in concert, and by mutual consent, and expressly comprehending each other therein."

What purpose could the renewal of this article serve, while a negociation for peace was proposed, but to continue, if not to perpetuate the war. On the one hand, we knew his Prussian Majesty wrote to his late Britannic Majesty, in terms not very respectful, even upon a surmise of a neutrality for Hanover. We knew that he would stick close by the above words of the fourth article of the convention, and leave nothing either to chance or our management; so that, infact, by this renewed convention, war or peace did not depend upon our but upon his pleasure. I cannot place this situation in a stronger light, than by supposing that this article had been omitted, as it undoubtedly ought to have been, considering the vast alteration of affairs, out of the renewed convention. What must have been the consequence? None; but that Great-Britain would have been left at liberty to have acted for her own interest, and perhaps much more for the interest of his Prussian Majesty, than she is enabled to do at present.

Instead of that, it appears by the answer which the King of Prussia sent to the French King's father-in-law, King Stanislaus, when he offered his capital of Nancy for the place of congress, "that we had not ventured to take a single step without his leave." This answer is dated from Freyburg, February 8, 1760, and contains in substance, that the courts of Vienna and Russia had refused to come into the measures which the King of England and he himself had proposed to them. Here is not a single word of France having refused; "but," continues his Prussian Majesty, "it is likely that they will draw the King of France into the continuance of the war, the advantages of which they alone expect to reap." This, we may reasonably presume, France was as sensible of as his Prussian Majesty; and it was the very strongest inducement for her to have agreed with us upon just and equitable terms, which, besides the effusion of blood, would have saved us at least ten millions of money, for I cannot estimate our useless campaigns in Germany of seventeen hundred and sixty, and seventeen hundred and sixty-one, at less.

But to make all the concessions that the right honourable gentleman and his friends can require, let us suppose the

the fourth article of the renewed convention of the 9th of November, 1759, to have been omitted; what must have been the consequence? We were by that time become not only the allies, but the protectors of his Prussian Majesty. Was not the British nation to be trusted with its own interests? Why should we be guided in Prussian trammels, or in Prussian leading-strings? It is absurd to think, supposing we had made a separate peace with France, we either would or could have sacrificed the King of Prussia. Far from that, it was our interest to preserve him, and in him the Protestant cause in Germany. A peace between Great-Britain and France must have left us at liberty to have served him so effectually, as I have already observed, that the two Empresses would have had neither the stomach nor the means to have continued the war.

But, in fact, the alternate stipulation I have quoted is, perhaps, unprecedented in history: His Prussian Majesty binds Great-Britain.—to do what? not to make peace with those powers she is already at peace with; for I know no war now subsisting between Great-Britain and either of the Empresses, or the crowns either of Poland or Sweden. This, I say, is an unprecedented measure, and perhaps irreconcileable to common sense; tho' it is plain his Prussian Majesty made it binding upon us. But, what has been thrown into the scale of Great-Britain, to counterbalance this incredible concession? Why that the King of Prussia shall not, without our consent, make a separate peace with any of the belligerent powers! Would to God, in the present situation of things, that it was in his power to do it? Happy would it be for Britain. Hanover would soon then be out of danger, and we might avoid the evils of the most widely diffused, and the most expensive war, that this or any other nation ever was engaged in.

Thus far, my Lord, I think it is evident beyond all contradiction, that the mutuality of the fourth article in the convention of November 9, 1759, has been of terrible consequences to this country, and that it is high time for Great-Britain to close the scene of war. Perhaps some reasons of a different nature from any I have yet mentioned, may make a solid, honourable, and an advantageous peace, still more desirable. We have had, for some years past, an army of the finest troops the sun ever saw, serving under a foreign prince, and in what we may call a foreign quarrel.

quarrel. To the amazement of England, and I may say, of Europe, after Broglio had taken the field with one hundred thousand men, when the Count de St. Germain commanded a separate army upon the Rhine, six regiments of English foot were sent to Germany, under the command of Major-general Griffin, and were followed by Elliot's light-horse; so that, at the beginning of the campaign of 1759, we had in Germany twelve regiments of heavy and one of light-horse, twelve regiments of foot, and two battalions of Highlanders; and, in the course of the campaign, we had no fewer than twenty-five thousand British troops, serving in the fields of Germany, while those of England were in danger of lying waste for want of cultivation; for, in proportion, as hands were sent abroad, the evacuations were supplied by militia, who, after being embodied, are, to all intents and purposes, as regular troops, and under as strict military discipline as those which form, what we call, our standing army.

Since the ridiculous flaunting expeditions two hundred years ago, under Henry VIII. into France, such a numerous body of British troops never has served upon the continent. But, my Lord, how have they been rewarded? by being taken at their word; by having the post of honour assigned to them. But why? because it was the post of danger. If a desperate attack was to be made; if an untenable pass was to be defended; if a fatiguing march was to be undertaken, all, all, was to be thrown upon the English. If any remonstrances, however dutiful were made, the answer was ready: "I was unwilling to disoblige you; " you desired to have the post of honour, and you have had " it; it is due to your valour." Thus, under the colour of having the post of honour, two or three campaigns passed, in which the British troops were exposed to all the fury and superior number of the enemies. Of this the battle of Felinghausen is a flagrant and a recent proof. The English General was to support himself the best way he could against three times the number of those he commanded, for above twelve hours, until his brave allies found leisure to come to his assistance, which, by the bye, they seem never to have done.

I mention those things, my Lord, not because I think the war is unfortunate, but because I think we are unfortunate in being at war upon the continent of Europe.

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Our successes in all other places, joined to the magnanimity of his late and present Majesty, in exposing Hanover to all the fury of its enemies, rather than conclude an inglorious peace for Great-Britain, have, by this time, awakened the French out of their favourite dreams of obtaining any thing from Great-Britain, if they demand it by the way of Germany, and that too, sword in hand. If therefore we can, with honour, and without hurting our interest, as I apprehend we easily can, (unless our notions of honour are romantic, and those of our interest extravagant) make a peace with France, there never can a juncture exist hereafter, that will call upon us to engage in a continental war. I do not mean by this, that Great-Britain is never to have any concern in the affairs of the continent. That would be as irrational as her having too great a concern in them; but I must be of opinion, that she never can have a call upon her for the same ruinous connections with it that she has at present.

I now, my Lord, come to the third proposition I laid down, which was, that a pacific system can receive no manner of shock by the resignation of the right honourable gentleman, who, a few days ago, gave up the seals of his office. We have been hurt; we are not ruined by the present war; and if we stop at this very crisis, all may yet be recovered. Peace is naturally the favourite system of a minister; though the right honourable gentleman is the second minister within these twenty years who has risen into power by war. But to use the words of the poet:

“ —— 'Tis an impious greatness,

“ And mixt with too much horror to be envied.”

The milder virtues of civil life are easily cultivated, and more generally understood. The right honourable gentleman and his friends themselves cannot, and will not deny, that a continental war is a misfortune to this country. The landed interest feels it severely, and all ranks and degrees amongst us endure it patiently, only because, as matters have been managed, it is become a necessary evil: an evil that is not the less lamented, because bravely supported; and an evil, supported by that spirit of loyalty and patriotism, not to be paralleled in all the preceding annals of British history. Very few arguments, my Lord, therefore will suffice to prove the truth of my third proposition. The people of England, even at this time, a little resemble the case of

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Sancha Pancha, and his master ; they think their patriot minister the best, the wisest, and the most upright servant any King or nation ever had yet ; yet, sometimes they know not what to make of him ; and they wish his conduct were a little more reconcileable to their plain capacities. Some late incidents have helped to increase their perplexities.

His Most Catholic Majesty, as is natural for every prince who has the means of doing it, is putting his marine upon a respectable footing. The situation of his affairs with those of his son and brother in Italy, and the formidable preparations of the Turks, said to be designed against Malta, which is a kind of bulwark to his dominions, might very well account for all the preparations he is making. The people of England, plain and uninformed as they are, had no manner of apprehension that his Catholic Majesty intended, that his naval armaments should take part with France against Great-Britain. Common sense told them, that the Spaniards in a war with England had every thing to fear, and nothing to hope for ; and that England could maintain a war against both the crowns with as little expence as she is at with one. In short, they thought that a Spanish war was too good news to be true, provided the Spaniards themselves sought for it. On the other hand, there was not, and I believe is not, a man of common sense in England, who thinks it would be right for us to promote such a war ; and that while Spain gives us no offence, we must be little better than pirates should we give her any.

But there was a time, viz. in the year 1718, when Great-Britain, without any formal declaration of war, destroyed the whole marine of Spain ; and therefore, nothing is to serve us, but to send a young nobleman of spirit, in the double character of plenipotentiary and admiral, or commodore, to demand from them a categorical answer, as to the destination of their armaments ; and, upon that not proving satisfactory, to sink, burn, and destroy.

That Sir George Byng, in that year, did, as is said above, is admitted ; but how different are the junctures ! Great-Britain was then guarantee for the Emperor's dominions in Italy ; and, while his Imperial Majesty was engaged in a bloody war against the Turks, the Spaniards,

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in a most ungenerous manner, endeavoured to deprive him of the island of Sardinia. The British court had employed all manner of pacific means to obtain from that of Madrid a suspension of arms, but to no purpose ; and their admiral was instructed to sail to the Mediterranean, and, if possible, to prevent any further breach of the neutrality of Italy ; but, if possible, to avoid coming to hostilities. Every one knows what followed : according to our accounts, the Spaniards were not only intractable, but were the aggressors. The consequence was, that their fleet was destroyed.

How different are the circumstances of the two junc-
tures. His Catholic Majesty has but lately mounted that
throne ; he is applying himself to the arts of peace ; he
is endeavouring both to cultivate and protect commerce ;
he, as well as his predecessor, has hitherto maintained the
most irreproachable neutrality in the present war between
us and France ; (for I mind not the unauthenticated sug-
gestions in news-papers) and the interests of his people point
out the friendship of Great-Britain, as the surest means of
their happiness and safety. His Catholic Majesty himself,
sensible of this, and, at the same time, not ignorant of the
effects of popular reports in this country, shews disposi-
tions for continuing and strengthening the peace between
us, and orders his ministers to give the strongest assurances
to our ambassador for that purpose. In what a light must
we appear to all Europe ; in what a light, my Lord, must
we appear to ourselves, should we wantonly provoke such
an ally ?

This being the case, what has this nation to apprehend
from the right honourable gentleman's resignation ? Will
France, will the Empress-queen, will any of the other belli-
gerent powers, take it amiss ? It would be ridiculous to ima-
gine that they will. Will his Prussian Majesty object to it ?
Not, if he mistakes not his own interest ; and no man
understands it better ; for, humanly speaking, it is peace
alone that can re-instate his affairs, secure what he pos-
sesses, and recover what he has lost. Will the people of
England take this resignation amiss ? No ; not if they are
properly informed. It has been attended with the high-
est marks of royal favour towards the resignee ; which
have been respectfully accepted. And, I believe, there is
scarcely a man in England, who does not think, that the
right honourable gentleman resigned, only because a great

majority, at a certain board, differ from him, as to the manner of making peace; for I must be of opinion, that war itself is one manner of making peace. The people of England are too rational to think, that any subject is vested with infallibility, and that his Majesty and his council have not a right to the use of their own senses. Give me leave to add, that, notwithstanding all the vapouring and blustering in our papers, and other publications, the people of England in general are heartily tired of the war, and will be extremely glad to sit quietly down, under such a peace, as it is, even at this time, in our power to command. None clamour for the continuance of war, but those who gain by it, and who, like the coasters in Cornwall and Shetland, subsist upon storms and shipwrecks. Honesty and industry, that is, such part of the subjects as pay the taxes, through which the war is continued, devoutly wish for the return of peace; and never was the happiness of any state permanent, when the welfare of such was not consulted. Mean while, I am not to be understood, as if the nation was disposed to accept of a dishonourable peace. Heavy as the expence, and cruel as the devastations of war are, I never heard a Briton throw out the smallest expression tending that way, but was rather for continuing the war, than for accepting of such a peace.

But, my Lord, the right honourable gentleman and his friends may possibly differ from others, about the manner of continuing the war. Supposing France, contrary to all truth and probability, should insist on our accepting terms dishonourable for us, the war must then continue; but is there a necessity for its being an offensive war? Are we to continue to multiply our expences, perhaps to double them, under the delusive prospect of future expeditions, the success of which is precarious, and may be abortive? Are we to keep up the compliment of our army in Germany, where the sword is scarcely wanted to hasten that destruction, which famine, fatigue, and wants of every kind is daily precipitating? There is another consideration, perhaps more important than all: That the power of Great-Britain is at present higher than ever was known, shall not be disputed; but, my Lord, the greatness of any people never was known to be permanent, but through the moderate use of power. A people, who shall indulge a wanton spirit of conquest, renders all other nations jealous

loss of them, a misfortune, which a trading people, of all others, ought chiefly to avoid. Commerce subsists by intercourse, and intercourse by friendship. There is a point of greatness, that a wise government will not wish to exceed. Hitherto our conquests have been such, as to give no just umbrage to the other powers of Europe; but who can answer for the consequences, should we reject terms of accommodation, that every other power in Europe may think to be just and honourable. I speak not this, as if I imagined, that the marine of Great-Britain is not at present a match for that of all Europe combined; I think it is, but I think, at the same time, that, by such a combination, our commerce may suffer in its most sensible parts; and will still go farther, and say, that the moment we declare ourselves the Drawcansirs of Europe, such a combination will take place. Upon the whole, my Lord, therefore, justice and moderation at such a period as this, will do more for the honour and interest of this kingdom, than the most commanding genius, and the most refined abilities. If the right honourable gentleman's resignation of the seals has removed from his Majesty's councils all temper and equity, we are certainly in a dangerous way. But, if there are still to be found at that board, men of candour and integrity, of practicable abilities, and upright intentions, I must be of opinion, in the words of my third proposition, That a pacific system can receive no shock, either at home or abroad, by that resignation, or twenty such.

My fourth proposition, my Lord, is, That the same right honourable gentleman and his friends, whose patriotism and disinterested attachment to their country cannot be questioned, will and must, in consistence with that character, co-operate in the same good work, whether he or they are in or out of place, as they cannot be suspected of distressing his Majesty's measures, even supposing them not to be their own.

This proposition does not require to be illustrated, for the information or conviction of the right honourable gentleman, or any of his friends in parliament, but for the sake of others without doors, who, for want of opportunity of knowing better, may think the honourable gentleman hardly treated, and therefore may disturb that unanimity without doors, that is so conspicuous at present. In the days of party bondage, when the people

of England were ground between the mill-stones of Whig-gery and Toryism; while they were wedged in between noise and nonsense; when all regard was held to men, and none to measures, the most uninformed subject in the kingdom could tell the fate of every question brought into parliament, let him know but the name of the person who brought it in, and the numbers by which it was lost or carried. After those destructive sounds of Whig and Tory began to lose their magical force, another distinction more plausible, but equally unmeaning, took place; I mean that of Court and Country; and the right honourable gentleman and his friends enlisted themselves under the banners of the latter, which they advanced in so many wordy combats, that they were at last worn to tatters, and most ungratefully thrown aside; for the moment that the right honourable gentleman and his friends came into power, I mean, directiye power, all distinctions were abolished, and Court and Country became the same.

The juncture is so recent, and the facts so well known, that it would be superfluous to put either your Lordship or them in mind of what followed; but because many without doors may either have forgot, or never known them, I shall but just mention some particulars, to the honour of that part of the administration, which, till that time, had generally been distinguished by the name of the Court-party. The right honourable gentleman and his friends may well remember the clamour raised without doors, on account of our disgraces in the Mediterranean, and the infinite advantages they promised themselves from their inquiry into the causes of the loss of Minorca. The public were taught to believe, that such scenes of corruption, cowardice, and mismanagement, would be discovered, during the course of that enquiry, as would oyerwhelm the ministry, or what we may call the Court-party, with shame and confusion, and disable them from ever again recovering the smallest credit, either with his Majesty or the people. The ministry, conscious of their innocence, to their credit be it spoken, dared their enemies to do their worst; brought the only culpable person to justice, against all the efforts of the right honourable gentleman and his friends, to divert, or, at least, to protract his fate, and stood the fiery trial of the enquiry, from which they came out more pure than before. Notwithstanding all this, irreproachable as their conduct

conduct was found to be, so loud was the popular clamour, which had been artfully and wickedly raised against them, that they did not think themselves capable of doing his Majesty the service they could wish to do, in their several stations, and they were the first who solicited his Majesty, to fill them with persons who were, at that time, more agreeable to his people. Those resignations took place; but I remember no pension that was entailed upon them, though one noble d—e, who then resigned, was the oldest minister his Majesty had, and had served him and his family, in so generous, so disinterested a manner, that it was reasonably to be supposed, a pension could be no disagreeable appenage to his retirement from public business.

The merit of those resignations were the greater, as it was well known that the resignees, had they pleased, might have continued in power. Yet this merit, great as it was, was not comparable to that of never once opposing the measures of the new ministry, tho' they might have done it with the fullest effect. Even personal resentments were dropt in their zeal for the public service, and sacrificed to the unanimity, which, in the beginning of a war, they considered as the great basis of his Majesty's glory, and the credit of the public. Whatever difference of opinions might have been in the council, or the cabinet, none appeared in parliament, or to the public; and it was hard to say, whether the old or the new ministry were the most ready in forwarding his Majesty's measures. A conduct so moderate, so self-denied to all resentment, so superior to all views but those of serving the public, was perhaps the greatest, if not the first, example of true patriotism ever exhibited in this country. It was, in fact, that which laid the foundation of that unanimity, in which his Majesty so justly gloried in the first speech he made to his parliament.

Are we then to suppose, that a party (I will avoid the hated word Faction) raised to power upon comprehensive, because constitutional principles, established upon the maxims of public unanimity, will not follow the glorious precedent that was set them by those whom they had no reason to think were their private friends. Should his Majesty and his council think proper to conclude a peace, which shall appear to them to be solid, honourable, and advantageous to this country, can we imagine that such

A set of men would overcast the auspicious dawn of his reign with the clouds of dissatisfaction, discontent, and opposition. Will they revive the national reproach of discord, the extinction of which his Majesty has told us, he looks upon to be his greatest glory, by opposing in parliament what has been agreed upon in council? This, my Lord, would be reviving the most pestilential qualities of party-spirit. The game of Whigs and Tories, when they happened to be out of power, was no other. Under the plausible, but at last, exploded pretext of public welfare, they rendered the crown contemptible, by thwarting, in parliament, the best concerted measures of the cabinet; and thus each party, in their turns, increased the public difficulties or distresses.

Supposing his Majesty and his administration should think proper to close the scene of blood, and to withdraw our troops from their shambles in Germany; can we imagine, that any set of men will stand up and say, We must have more slaughter; Great-Britain is not yet sufficiently exhausted; a more plentiful effusion of blood will do her service? Supposing a defensive war to be concluded upon, and that it is resolved to turn the tables upon France, and oblige her either to give us reasonable terms, or to act in America the same expensive part that we have done since the commencement of this war: should this be the determination, can we imagine any set of men to be so abandoned as to say in parliament, You are too rich; your manufactures are too flourishing; have at all, or nothing; never give over your offensive war, while France has a foot of land in America or the East Indies; and put all the powers of Europe, friends as well as foes, to defiance? Should his Majesty fall upon the means of averting the impending danger of Hanover, and of indemnifying his Prussian Majesty, for withdrawing our troops from Germany, can any objection be raised to such measures, but such as must proceed from malignant dispositions, and impotent resentment?

We must therefore, my Lord, if we reason consistently with common sense, conclude, that the right honourable gentleman and his friends never will forfeit the venerable appellation of Patriots, by attempting either to renew or to continue the distresses of their country? If ever unanimity was necessary to a nation, it is to us at this juncture; and the first man who attempts to break it in parliament ought

ought to be considered as a public enemy to his country. Great-Britain has nothing to fear but from disunion; and if we keep sight of our interests, with the smallest portion of common sense, no such disunion can now happen. The right honourable gentleman having resigned his post is no argument of his having lost his power or influence in his Majesty's councils. A minister so well-intentioned, as all the nation pronounces him to be, never will withdraw, out of post, the same assistances he would have given to government, had he been in post. Should he ever be overruled at a certain board, he will think that the breach of national unanimity is a far greater evil than his submitting to the opinions of others ever can prove; and no private resentment, either of his own, or of his friends, will ever influence his public conduct. The generous mark of regard which his Majesty has bestowed upon him for his past conduct, claims his future services. If his Majesty had not even conferred that recompence upon him, yet a patriot will always be ready in the service of his master and his country, whether he is a minister or a private person.

Thus, my Lord, I have endeavoured to obviate every possible apprehension that can be raised in the minds of the people, either in their collective or representative capacity, at this important crisis. The alteration this interesting resignation may produce, can, in fact, be attended with no bad consequences, but from the ferment that it may occasion in the minds of those who are well intentioned, and who may be worked upon by the art and insinuations of those who are enemies to this country. To obviate those consequences is the well-meaning design of this address. When the people of England recovers a surprise, or a consternation, they are the most reasonable people on the face of the earth.

I own, in the mean time, my Lord, that I had another view in this address, which was, to second the wishes of the people, which undoubtedly are for peace, without our insisting upon our romantic inadmissible terms; and to let them know, that the resignation of one minister, be his abilities, his station, and his popularity ever so great, never can, or at least never ought, in the present juncture of unanimity, distress the measures of a prince beloved by his people, or a people trusted by their prince.


I have the honour to be,
M Y L O R D,
Your Lordship's most obedient
Humble servant.

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